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Abstract. This paper introduces a run-time mechanism for preventing
leakage of secure information in distributed systems. We consider a gen-
eral concurrency language model, where concurrent objects interact by
asynchronous method calls and futures. The aim is to prevent leakage
of confidential information to low-level viewers. The approach is based
on the notion of a security wrapper, which encloses an object or a com-
ponent and controls its interactions with the environment. A wrapper
is a mechanism added by the run-time system to provide protection of
an insecure component according to some security policies. The security
policies of a wrapper are formalized based on a notion of security levels.
At run-time, future components will be wrapped upon need, while only
objects of unsafe classes will be wrapped, using static checking to limit
the number of unsafe classes and thereby reducing run-time overhead.
We define an operational semantics and prove that non-interference is
satisfied. A service provider may use wrappers to protect its services
in an insecure environment, and vice-versa: a system platform may use
wrappers to protect itself from insecure service providers.
Keywords: Active objects · Futures · Information-flow security · Non-
interference · Dynamic analysis · Static analysis · Distributed systems
1 Introduction
Given the large number of users and service providers involved in a distributed
system, security is a critical concern. It is thus essential to analyze and control
how confidential information propagates between nodes. When a program exe-
cutes, it might leak secure information to public outputs or send it to malicious
nodes. Information-flow control approaches track how information propagates
through the program during execution and prevent leakage of secure informa-
tion [20]. Program variables are tagged typically with security levels, for exam-
ple, high and low to indicate secure and public data, and the semantic notion
of information-flow security is based on non-interference [9]. This means that in
any two executions, when a program is run with a variation of high inputs but
the same low input values, the low outputs will be the same (at least for locally
deterministic programs). This way, an attacker cannot see any variation between
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these two executions since low outputs are independent of the high inputs. It is
assumed that an attacker is a low level object that is communicating with the
system.
Active object languages are concurrent programming languages suitable for
designing distributed and object-oriented systems. The goal is to design an effi-
cient, permissive, and precise security mechanism that can be applied to these
languages, supporting concurrency and communication paradigms like futures.
A future is a read-only component, which is created by a remote method call
and eventually will contain the corresponding return value [3]. Therefore, the
caller needs not block while waiting to get the return value: it can continue with
other tasks and later get the value from the corresponding future. Futures can
be passed to other objects, called first-class futures. In this case, any object that
has a reference to a future can access its content, which may be a security threat
if the future contains secure data. Futures offer a flexible way of communication
and sharing results, but handling them appropriately, in order to avoid security
leakages, is challenging [14].
Our security mechanism is inspired by the notion of wrappers in [18], where
a wrapper encloses an object and enforces safety rules. In this paper, we suggest
a notion of security wrapper, which wraps an object or a future at run-time and
performs security controls. Such wrappers are added to a high-level concurrent
core language, supporting asynchronous method calls and futures. Wrappers
are invisible in the sense that a wrapped component and its environment are
not aware of it. Security wrappers block illegal object communications, leading
to leakage of confidential data to unauthorized object. Moreover, they protect
futures if they contain high return values, preventing illegal access by lower level
objects. The security policies and semantics of a wrapper are defined based on
run-time security levels, which are resulted from a flow-sensitive and dynamic
information-flow enforcement. Therefore, our dynamic approach guarantees some
levels of permissiveness and is precise since it deals with the exact run-time
security levels. The operational semantics of our security framework is provided
in the style of Structured Operational Semantics (SOS), modeled in the Maude
system [8], giving an executable interpreter for programs written in our language.
In order to have less run-time overhead, we suggest static analysis to identify
where security checking and wrappers are needed since often only a few methods
deal with secure information. Assuming a sound static analysis, we prove that
our proposed security mechanism ensures the non-interference property in object
communications.
In summary, our contributions are: i) a high-level core language as a model
for service-oriented and distributed systems (Sec 2.1), ii) a built-in notion of
security wrappers for enforcing noninterference and security control in object
interactions (Sec 3), for which we use static analysis to reduce the run-time
overhead (Sec 3.1), and provide an executable operational semantics for the
dynamic information-flow enforcement and wrappers (Secs 3.2, 3.3), and iii) an
outline of the proof that our model satisfies non-interference (the details are
found in the appendix Sec 5.1).
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2 Background
Information-flow control approaches detect illegal flows. During program execu-
tion, there are two kinds of leakage of information, namely explicit and implicit
flows [20]. For simplicity, we assume two security levels L (low) andH (high). An
explicit flow happens by assigning a high variable to a low one (l := h), where the
variables l and h store secret and public values. One way to deal with this is to
let the level of l be changed toH (assuming l is not directly observable by attack-
ers). In an implicit flow, there is an indirect flow of information due to control
flow structures. For example, in the if statement: l := 0; if h then l := 1 fi,
the guard h is high, and it affects the value of l indirectly. In order to avoid
implicit flows, a program-counter label (pc) is introduced, which captures the
program context security level [20]. If the guard is high, then pc becomes high.
Information-flow control approaches are divided into two categories, static
and dynamic [19]. Static analysis is conservative: in order to be sound, it over-
approximates security levels of variables (for example, it over-approximates a
formal parameter to high, while at run-time a corresponding actual parameter
can be low). This causes unnecessary rejections of programs, especially when
the complete program is not statically known, as is usually the case in dis-
tributed systems. On the other hand, static analysis has less run-time overhead,
since security checks are performed before program execution [19]. Dynamic
information-flow techniques perform security checks at run-time, and this in-
troduces an overhead. But they are more permissive and precise since they deal
with the exact security levels of variables instead of an over-approximation [11].
In what follows, we briefly explain some of the terminologies of information-
flow security that we use in this paper:
Security levels. Variables are tagged with security levels, organized by a par-
tial order ⊑ and a join ⊔ operator, such that L ⊑ H and L⊔H = H . Given two
security levels, the ⊔ operator returns the least upper bound of them. The policy
rules describe the flow of information regarding security levels. Inside a class,
declarations of fields, class parameters, and formal parameters may have stati-
cally declared initial security levels. These levels may change with statements.
At run-time, objects are assigned security levels as well.
Flow-sensitivity. In a flow-sensitive analysis, variables start with their de-
clared security levels (the ones without levels are assumed as L), but levels may
change after each statement. In an assignment, the level of a left-hand-side be-
comes high if pc is high, or there is a high variable on the right-hand-side. The
level of a left-hand-side becomes low if the assignment does not occur in a high
context, and there are no high variables on the right-hand-side [19]. Otherwise,
the security level of a variable does not change. For example, a flow-sensitive
analysis accepts the program h := 0; if h then l := 1 fi; return l; since h
is updated to low after the first assignment, and there is no leakage. In an as-
signment x := e, the security level of x is updated to the join of the security
level of pc and expression e, which is the join of the security levels of variables
in e [19]. By a flow-sensitive dynamic analysis, security levels propagate to other
variables, and precise levels are evaluated during execution. In [19], it is shown
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that although this technique is permissive, it is unsound because of implicit flows
that happen in conditional structures with high guards. The authors propose a
conservative dataflow rule to avoid the implicit flows. When the guard is high,
the security levels of variables appearing on the left-hand side of assignments
in the taken and untaken branches are raised to high. For instance, consider-
ing an initial environment Γ ={h 7→ H, l1 7→ L, l2 7→ L} and the program:
if h then l1 := 1; else l2 := 0; fi when the condition is true, Γ changes to
Γ ={h 7→ H, l1 7→ H, l2 7→ H} for a sound flow-sensitive analysis [19].
Active object languages have gained a lot of attention in recent years [4]. They
are based on a combination of the actor model [1] and object-oriented features.
Some well-known active object languages are Rebeca [21,22], Scala/Akka [10,23],
Creol [13], ABS [12], Encore [5], and ASP/ProActive [7,6]. In the call/return
paradigm without futures, a method call and the corresponding return value are
sent by message passing between the caller and callee objects. An object has
an external queue for receiving these messages. In a naive model, a caller waits
while the callee computes the call, such a call is blocking, which is undesirable.
The notion of futures is a common mechanism in active object languages for
avoiding blocking calls [4,14]. When a remote method call is made, a future object
with a unique identity is created. The caller may continue with other processes
while the callee is computing the return value. The callee sends back the return
value to the corresponding future object, and then the future is called resolved.
The future mechanism gives the flexibility that in a service-oriented system, a
client program waits only when it needs to get the value from a future object.
Futures can be explicit with a specific type and access operations like in ABS
or can be implicit with automatic creation and access [4]. An explicit future
in ABS is created as f := o!m(e); v := f.get, where f is a future variable of
type Fut [T ], and T is the type of the future value. The symbol ”!” indicates an
asynchronous method call m of object o, and the future value is retrieved with a
get construct. In contrast, a synchronous call is denoted by o.m(e), which blocks
the caller until the return value is retrieved.
Information-flow security with futures
Static analysis would be difficult for programs with futures, where the result of
a call is no longer syntactically connected to the call, compared to the call/re-
turn paradigm in languages without futures [14]. For example, a future may be
created in one module and received as a parameter in another. A future may not
statically correspond to a unique call statement. One can overestimate the set of
possible call statements that correspond to this given future parameter, but it
needs access to the whole program, which is a problem with distributed systems.
Moreover, the return values of these overestimated calls may have different se-
curity levels. In this case, the highest security level for a future is overestimated.
In static analysis there is limited static knowledge about object identities.
Therefore a language may compensate by including a syntactic construct for
testing security levels, as in [17]. By testing relevant security levels, one may
achieve fine-grained security control (at the cost of added branching structure).
A static analysis that assumes future references as low allows passing of futures.
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Basic constructs
x := newlev c(e) object creation with the security level lev
return e creating a method result/future value
if b th s [el s′] fi if statement (b a Boolean condition)
!o.m(e) simple asynchronous remote call
q!o.m(e) remote asynchronous call, future variable q
q?(x) blocking access operation on future q
Fig. 1. Core Syntax.
However, the exact security level of a future value is revealed when it becomes
resolved. A dynamic approach is required to control access to a future value at
run-time when it is resolved, and if the value is high it needs protection. The
concept of futures makes static checking less precise, and the need for comple-
mentary run-time checking is greater, as provided in the present paper.
2.1 A core language syntax
In order to exemplify our security approach, the security semantics (in Sec. 3.2) is
embedded in a core language, using a syntax similar to Creol/ABS. Our security
approach can be applied to any active object language with futures. In our
core language, all remote object interactions are made by means of futures.
Therefore, the result of a remote call always is returned back to the corresponding
future. Figure 1 provides the core language syntax. The statement o!m(e) is an
asynchronous call toward object o without waiting for the result and associating
a future for the call. Here omay be a list of objects, broadcasting to those objects,
and e is a list of actual parameters. The statement q!o.m(e) is an asynchronous
and remote method call, which creates an explicit future and assigns the identity
to the future variable q. A return value can be accessed with a get statement
q?(x), which blocks while waiting for the corresponding future to become resolved
and then assigns the value to the variable x. The statement q?(x) is similar to
x = q.get in ABS.
Figure 2 illustrates an example of a health care service in our core language,
involving futures for communication and sharing of secure medical records. High
variables are emphasized based on static analysis/user specifications, in this case
reflecting patients’ medical test results. The problem the system is trying to solve
is to prevent personnel and patients with lower-level access from accessing the
medical records. In this example, the server, specified by class Service, searches
for the test result of a patient and publishes it to the patient and associated
personnel through the proxy object. The server uses futures to communicate test
results to the proxy, thus it does not wait for the results and is free to respond to
any client request. Instead, the proxy waits for the results from the laboratory
and publishes them. In line 10, a produce cycle is initiated between the server
and proxy. In line 13, the server searches for the test results of this patient by
sending a remote asynchronous call to the laboratory q!lab.detectResult, where q
is the future variable and lab is the callee. In line 14, the future is passed to object
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1 data type Result = ... // definition of medical data
2 interface ServiceI { Void produce() ... }
3 interface ProxyI { Void publish(Fut[Result] q, PatientI a, List[PersonnelI] d) ... }
4 interface LabI { ResultH detectResult(PatientI a) ... }
5 interface PatientI { Void signal(ResultH r) ... }
6 interface PersonnelI { Void signal(ResultH r) ... }
7 interface DataBase { ... }
8 class Service(LabI lab, DataBase db) implements ServiceI {
9 ProxyI proxy = new Proxy(this);
10 !this.produce(); // initial action, starting a produce cycle
11 Void produce() { Fut[Result] q; PatientI a; List[PersonnelI] d = Nil;
12 .... // finding a patient and the associated personnel in database
13 q!lab.detectResult(a);
14 !proxy.publish(q, a, d); } } // sending the future (q), no waiting
15
16 class Proxy(ServiceI s) implements ProxyI{ ResultH r;
17 Void publish(Fut[Result] q, PatientI a, List[PersonnelI] d) {
18 q?(r); // waiting for future and assigning the value to r
19 !a.signal(r); // r is now H
20 !d.signal(r); // multicasting, r is H
21 !s.produce(); } }
Fig. 2. Example of sharing high patients’ test results by means of futures
proxy for publishing, and this object waits and assigns the result to the variable
r as in line 18. Then object proxy sends r to the patient and health personnel. A
static analysis over-approximates the security levels of test results as high, which
leads to rejections of information passing. Note that the two signal calls in class
Proxy would not be allowed if we only use static checking since we cannot tell
which patients and personnel have a high enough level. A static analysis which
considers references as low allows passing a future q to object proxy (line 14), but
later when it is resolved, the future value can be high, and proxy compromises
security by sending this value to other objects.
3 A framework for non-interference
Like Creol/ABS, our core language is equipped with behavioral interfaces, which
means that created objects are typed by interfaces, not classes [13]. As a result,
remote access to fields or methods that are not declared through an interface
is impossible. Therefore, observable behavior of an object is limited to its in-
teractions through remote method calls. Illegal object interactions are the ones
leading to an information-flow from high to low level information holders. In
this paper, we exploit the notion of wrappers to perform dynamic checking for
enforcing non-interference in object interactions. The operational semantics of
wrappers is explained in Sec. 3.3. An object can reveal confidential information
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through outgoing method calls by sending actual parameters with high security
levels to lower level objects. In this case, a wrapper based on the security poli-
cies, blocks illegal communications. A future is wrapped when there is a high
return value, the wrapper controls access to the value and blocks illegal ones.
Security policies of a wrapper are based on run-time security levels. Inside an ob-
ject, in order to compute the exact security levels of created messages or return
values, flow-sensitivity must be active, using dynamic information-flow enforce-
ment. The operational semantics of our dynamic flow-sensitive enforcement is
given in Sec. 3.2.
We can be conservative and wrap all objects and correspondingly activate
flow-sensitivity, but this will cost run-time overhead. In order to be more efficient
at run-time, it is important to perform dynamic checking only for components
where it is necessary. We benefit from a class-wise static analysis to categorize a
class definition as safe or unsafe. A class is safe if it does not have any method
calls with high actual parameters and return values. A class is unsafe if it has
a method call with at least one high actual parameter or a high return value.
Objects created from unsafe classes are wrapped with active flow-sensitivity.
While objects from safe classes do not need a wrapper or active flow-sensitivity.
This will make the execution of objects of safe classes faster, as we avoid a
potentially large number of run-time checks and wrappers.
By combining our dynamic approach with static analysis, we benefit from
the advantages of both approaches, shown in the table below, where + is better
that −. Namely, we do not do runtime checking of statically safe classes. The
gray cells demonstrate our approach’s advantages.
static analysis dynamic analysis
runtime efficiency + -
exact security and permissiveness - +
3.1 Static analysis
Our security approach can be combined with a sound static over-approximation
for detecting security errors and safe classes, for instance, the one proposed
in [17], which is more permissive (to classify a class as safe) than the static
analysis indicated here, in that high communication is considered secure as long
as the declared levels of parameters are respected. Class fields and methods’
formal parameters and return values are declared with maximum security levels
(maximum of possible level that can be assigned at run-time). Local variables
that do not have a declared security level, they start with security level L (as
default) but may change after each statement due to flow-sensitivity. Since an
object encapsulates local data and fields, there is no need to control the flow of
information inside an object. However, since all object interactions are done by
method calls, typing rules are defined to control security levels of return values
and actual parameters [17]. A class is defined as safe if the confidentiality of each
method is satisfied. The confidentiality of a method is satisfied if the typing rules
for its return value and actual parameters are satisfied. The typing rules check
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that each occurrence of an actual parameter and a return value are not high;
then, the class is safe; otherwise, it is unsafe and needs dynamic checking..
We categorize safe and unsafe classes for the example in Fig. 2. The interface
laboratory LabI has a method with a high return value (detectResult). Thus the
object lab is unsafe and flow-sensitivity is active to compute the security level
of the return value at run-time. The class Proxy is unsafe since it has at least
one method call with a high actual parameter, thus object proxy is active flow-
sensitive and wrapped. Based on the security levels of a patient and personnel,
the wrapper of object Proxy decides whether to send out the signal messages or
block them. Precise level information for objects is available at run-time.
3.2 Security semantics
We here discuss the operational semantics of our core language with the embed-
ded notions of flow-sensitivity and security wrappers. The small-step operational
semantics is defined by a set of rewrite logic (RL) rules in the Maude format.
Maude uses sorts to define data types and data structures together with opera-
tor functions to manipulate values and define the value set of a sort. Operator
functions are defined by equations. Rules and equations can be conditional as
lhs −→ rhs if condition for rules and rhs = lhs if condition for equations. A
systems is modeled as multisets consisting of the relevant components and mes-
sages, and the outcome can be different based on non-deterministic applications
of rules. Maude has a built-in understanding of associativity, commutativity, and
identity, which are used to define multisets. A system state is modeled as a con-
figuration, which is a multiset of objects (with or without active flow-sensitivity),
queues, messages, futures, and wrappers.
sorts Class Object Queue Msg Future Wrapper Configuration .
subsorts Class Object Queue Msg Future Wrapper < Configuration .
op none : −→ Configuration .
op : Configuration Configuration −→ Configuration [assoc comm id: none] .
The Configuration sort is a super sort of the components’ sorts. (Classes
are included in a configuration to provide static information about fields and
methods.) The first operator (which does not take any arguments) defines none
as a constant of sort Configuration, representing an empty state. The binary
multiset operator defines the Configuration sort as a multiset. The underscores
( ) determine where the arguments should be placed. In Maude, an object is
represented by a term < o : c | Att1 : v1, ...,Attn : vn >, where o is the object
name, c is its class name, the Att i’s are the object attributes, and the vi’s are
the corresponding meta variables, representing instances [16].
Figure 3 represents the components of a configuration. An object component
is represented as: < o : c | Att : a,Pr : (l, sl),Cnt : n,Lvl : lev >, where o is
the object identity, c is the class name that the object is created from, a is the
object fields’ state (a mapping from instance variables to values), the pair (l, sl)
represents the current active process, where l is the state of local variables (a
mapping from local variables to values), and sl is a list of statements in the active
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object < o : c | Att : a,Pr : (l, sl),Cnt : n,Lvl : lev >
flowsen-obj < o : c | Att : a,Pr : (l, sl),Cnt : n,Lvl : lev , F lw : X,Pc : pcs >
class < Cl : c | Att : a′,Mtds : mm,Cnt : f >
unsafe-class < Cl : c | Att : a′,Mtds : mm,Cnt : f, F lw : X >
queue < Qu : o | Ev : msg >
invoc-msg invc(fId ,m, dl) o to o′
comp-msg comp(d) o to fId
future fut(fId , d)
wrapper {Wr : wId ,Lvl : lev | config}
Fig. 3. The components of a configuration.
process. The attribute n is a natural number to assign unique identities to each
method invocation created by the object. Variable lev is the security level of the
object (lev ∈ {L, H}), which is assigned by a programmer at the time of creating
an object, using the syntax x := newlev c
′(..). A flowsen-obj component shows
an object with active flow-sensitivity, with extra fields Flw : X, representing
active flow-sensitivity, and pcs denotes a stack of context security levels inside
an object. An empty stack (pcs = emp) corresponds to pc = L, representing a low
context security level. A non-empty stack (pcs 6= emp) corresponds to pc = H ,
representing a high context security level. A class is represented as: < Cl :
c | Att : a′,Mtds : mm,Cnt : f >, where c is the class name, a′ is the class fields
state (attributes), mm is a multiset of method declarations (with local variables
and code), and f is a natural number for generating unique object identities.
The unsafe-class component has an additional field Flw : X, denoting that all
objects created from this class will be wrapped with active flow-sensitivity.
The queue component represents the external queue of an object for storing
method invocations toward the object. The queue is associated with object o, and
msg is a multiset of stored messages. The invoc-msg component represents an
invocation message, where fId is the future identity,m is the called method name,
and dl is a list of actual parameters. The comp-msg component represents a
completion message, where d is the return value from object o to the future fId .
The future component shows a resolved future with identity fId and value d, and
fut(fId , ) indicates an unresolved future with no value. A security wrapper is
represented as: {Wr : wId ,Lvl : lev |config}, where wId is the wrapper’s identity,
lev the level, and the meta variable config denotes the configuration inside the
wrapper. A wrapper wraps a future or an object and correspondingly, gets the
identity and level of that component. A wrapper acquires and records the security
levels of destination objects before sending messages, which we ignore here.
Operational semantics is defined by a number of rewrite rules, which are
applied non-deterministically. If the left-hand-side of a rule matches a subset of a
configuration, this rule can be applied, and the left-hand-side pattern is replaced
by the corresponding instance of the right-hand-side. Since configurations can
be nested inside wrappers, the rules can also be applied to inner configurations.
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Non-overlapping rules may be applied in parallel indicating non-determinism and
concurrency. Each rule involves one object, implying that objects are executing
independent. For simplicity, in the right-hand-side of the rules, fields that are
as in the left-hand-side are ignored and indicated by ..., but changed fields are
shown.
Figure 4 represents the flow-sensitivity semantics of objects. The new rule
shows the command x := newlevc
′(e) in the active process of object o, creating
a new object from an unsafe class c′. It creates an active flow-sensitive object
inside a wrapper. The wrapper gets the same identity and level as the new object,
Wr : newId ,Lvl : lev , and it wraps the queue as well. newId is an abbreviation
for a function new(c′, f), which creates a unique object identity from the class
name c′ and object counter f . This rule assigns newId to the variable x and
increases the object counter by one in the class c′. The active process of the
new object is initialized with (empty, idle), denoting an empty state of local
variables and an empty statement list (no active process), respectively. The new
object level is lev as it is specified in the command newlevc
′(e), if not, the level is
assumed low. The other fields are initialized as Flw : X and Pc : emp, where the
latter represents an empty stack of context security level. The queue is associated
to the new object’s identity with no stored messages (noMsg). The semantics of
the actual class parameters is treated like parameters of an asynchronous call
!x.init(e), where init is the name of the initialization method of a class.
In an active flow-sensitive object, the evaluation result of an expression e is
denoted by [e], which returns back both the value (d) and security level (lev )
as dlev . If this value is assigned to a program variable x, the binding x 7→ dlev
is added to the corresponding state in the object. At the time of analysis, a
variable without a security level is assumed low (which might change afterward).
The function level ([e]) returns back the security level of [e] (lev ). If e is a list of
expressions, then level ([e]) returns the join of security levels of expressions in e.
In addition, [e] is an abbreviation for eval(e, a#l). The eval function evaluates an
expression e by considering the map composition of a and l (i.e., a#l), denoting
that the binding of a variable name in the inner scope l shadows any binding
of that name in the outer scope a [14]. Considering a variable x, the function
eval (x, a#l) returns eval(x, l) if l has a binding for x; otherwise, eval (x, a).
The Rule assign shows an assignment statement of (x := e) in an active
flow-sensitive object. The function dom(x, l) is true if variable x is in the local
state l, then x with its new value and level is updated in l by a function insert ;
otherwise, it is updated in the attribute state a. Variable x is updated to x 7→
[e]level([e])⊔pc in the corresponding domain (pc = H if pcs 6= emp, and pc = L
if pcs = emp). A variable is added to the domain with at least the pc level.
This rule inserts variables containing the identity of a new object or future with
the pc level, although they are not confidential. The if-low is applied when the
guard’s security level is low and pcs = emp, here T denotes true. The guard
is evaluated and the corresponding branch is taken. When the guard’s security
level is high or the pcs stack is not empty, similar to the approach in [19],
the security levels of variables appearing in both branches are raised to high
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new < o : c |Att : a,Pr : (l, x := newlev c
′(e); sl),Cnt : n,Lvl : lev ′ >
< Cl : c′|Att : a′,Mtds : mm,Cnt : f, F lw : X >
−→ < o : c|...,Pr : (l, x := newId ; !x.init(e); sl), ...> < Cl : c′|...,Cnt : f + 1, ... >
{Wr : newId ,Lvl : lev | < newId : c′|Att : a′, this 7→ newId ,Pr : (empty , idle),
Cnt : 1,Lvl : lev , F lw : X,Pc : emp > < Qu : newId | Ev : noMsg > }
assign < o : c | Att : a,Pr : (l, x := e; sl),Cnt : n,Lvl : lev , F lw : X,Pc : pcs >
−→ if (dom(x , l)) < o : c | ...,Pr : (insert(x, [e]level([e])⊔pc, l), sl), ... >
else < o : c | Att : insert(x, [e]level([e])⊔pc, a),Pr : (l, sl), ... >
if-low < o : c | Att : a,Pr : (l, if e th sl ′ el sl ′′ fi; sl), ..., F lw : X,Pc : pcs >
−→ if ([e] = T ) < o : c |...,Pr : (l, sl ′; sl), ...> else < o : c|...,Pr : (l, sl ′′; sl), ...>
if level([e]) = L ∧ pcs = emp
if-high < o : c | Att : a,Pr : (l, if e th sl ′ el sl ′′ fi; sl), ..., F lw : X,Pc : pcs >
−→ if ([e] = T ) < o : c|...,Pr : (l, sl ′; endif (sl ′′); sl), ...,Pc : pcs .push(H ) >
else < o : c | ...,Pr : (l, sl ′′; endif (sl ′); sl), ...,Pc : pcs .push(H ) >
if level [e] = H ∨ pcs 6= emp
endif < o : c|Att : a,Pr : (l, endif (sl ′); sl),Cnt : n,Lvl : lev , F lw : X,Pc : pcs >
−→ < o : c|...,Pr : (l, updateH (sl
′); sl), ...,Pc : pcs .pop() >
start < o : c | Att : a,Pr : (empty , idle),Cnt : n,Lvl : lev , ... >
< Qu : o | Ev : msg invc(Id ,m, dl) >
−→ < o : c|Att : a,Pr : ([label 7→ Id , x 7→ dl , l 7→ l0], sl), ...>< Qu : o|Ev : msg >
where method m binds to m(x){l0; sl ; } with initial local state l0
call < o : c | Att : a,Pr : (l, q!e.m(e); sl),Cnt : n,Lvl : lev , ... >
−→ < o : c | Att : a,Pr : (l, q := nfId ; !e.m(e); sl), ... > fut(nfId , )
call’ < o : c | Att : a,Pr : (l, !e.m(e); sl),Cnt : n,Lvl : lev , F lw : X,Pc : pcs >
−→ < o : c|...,Pr : (l, sl),Cnt : n+ 1, ... > (invc(nfId ,m, [e]) o to [e])level([e])⊔pc
return < o : c|Att : a,Pr : (l, return(d); ),Cnt : n,Lvl : lev , F lw : X,Pc : pcs >
−→ < o : c|...,Pr : (empty , idle), ... > (comp(d) o to eval(label , l))level(d)⊔pc
Fig. 4. Flow-sensitivity operational semantics, where newId = new (c′, f), [e] =
eval(e, (a#l)), T = true , and nfId = new(o, n).
to avoid implicit flows. This is captured in the if-high rule, where the guard’s
security level (level ([e]) = H) is pushed to the pcs stack, resulting in pc = H . In
addition, an auxiliary function endif (sl ′) is defined to mark the join point of the
if structure, where sl ′ is the untaken branch. In the endif rule, the function
updateH(sl
′) raises the security levels of variables appearing in the left-hand-
side of assignments in sl ′ to high. Moreover, the last element of pcs is removed
(pcs .pop()), reflecting the previous context level.
The start rule is applied when there is no active process inside an object
(the object is idle), and there is an invocation message in the queue. The ob-
ject starts executing the corresponding method. The rule captures the method’s
body sl as the active process, and the object’s local state is updated, binding
formal parameters to the actual ones and storing the future identity (Id) as
label . The label variable is used later to return back the result of a method to
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the corresponding future. In the rules, we do not cover local calls, which do not
involve object interactions (therefore, less interesting here). The call rule deals
with an asynchronous and remote method call q!e.m(e), where q is a future vari-
able, and e is the callee. The call is reduced to !e.m(e), and a (not resolved)
future with identity nfId is created. The nfId is an abbreviation for function
new(o, n), which creates a unique identity from the object name o and n. The
new identity nfId is assigned to the future variable q. The rule call’ shows an
asynchronous call !e.m(e) in an active flow-sensitive object, which creates an
invocation message toward the callee. The invocation message contains nfId ,
method name m, and actual parameters e. The security level of the invocation
message is level ([e]) ⊔ pc, which is the join of security levels of the actual pa-
rameters in e and pc. The level level([e]) ⊔ pc = L if all the actual parameters
in e are low and pc = L. The return rule interprets a return statement in
an active flow-sensitive object, which creates a completion message toward the
corresponding future (eval(label , l)), and the object becomes idle. The security
level of the completion message is level (d) ⊔ pc, and d is the return value. We
assume that each method body ends with a return statement.
3.3 Operational semantics of security wrappers
A wrapper is assigned to an object or a future by the run-time system. All
invocation messages generated from a wrapped object first meet the wrapper
for security checking. The w-invc rule in Fig. 5, represents a wrapper with an
invocation message inside, and if the security level of the message is less than
or equal to the destination object level (level (o′)), then the wrapper allows the
message to go out. Otherwise, the wrapper eats the message, and it disappears
from inside. In this case, an object performing a get will deadlock because the
invocation message was deleted. We have extended the approach with a notion
of errors, so that the deletion of an invocation message results in an error value
in the corresponding future component. This can be combined with an exception
handling mechanism such that an exception is raised when a get operation tries to
access an error value. However, as this is beyond the scope of this paper, we ignore
the exception handling part. We simply indicate exceptions by assignments with
error in the right-hand-side. The fut-get’ rule represents the case when a future
value is error, and an object performs a get command fId?(x) raises an exception
instead of being blocked.
The invc-w’ rule represents a wrapper and an incoming invocation message
toward the object (o). The notation Λ[m, i] indicates the level of the ith formal
parameter of the method m as declared in the class. If the security level of each
actual parameter (dl i) is less than or equal to the security level of the corre-
sponding formal parameter, then the wrapper allows the message to go through
and adds it to its configuration inside. The invc-q equation stores an invoca-
tion message toward an object in the corresponding queue for later processing.
This equation has priority over the rule of sending out an invocation message
from a wrapper (if both rules apply), since in Maude, an equation has priority
over a rule. The w-fut rule represents an unresolved future and a corresponding
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w-invc { Wr : o,Lvl : lev | (invc(fId ,m, dl) o to o′)lev′config } fut(fId , )
−→ if (lev ′ ⊑ level(o′)) {Wr : o,Lvl : lev |config}(invc(fId ,m, dl) o to o′)lev ′
fut(fId , )
else { Wr : o, Lvl : lev | config } fut(fId , error)
fut-get’ fut(fId , error) < o : c | Att : a,Pr : (l, fId?(x); sl),Cnt : f,Lvl : lev , ... >
−→ fut(fId , error) < o : c | ...,Pr : (l, x := error; sl), ... >
invc-w’ { Wr : o, Lvl : lev | config } invc(Id , m, dl) o′ to o
−→ if (∀i : level(dl i) ⊑ Λ[m, i]) {Wr : o,Lvl : lev |(invc(Id ,m, dl) o
′ to o)config}
else { Wr : o, Lvl : lev | config }
invc-q < Qu : o|Ev : msg > invc(Id ,m, dl) o′ to o =< ...|Ev : msg invc(Id ,m, dl) >
w-fut fut(fId , ) (comp(d) o′ to fId)lev
−→ if (lev = H) { Wr : fId ,Lvl : lev | fut(fId, d) } else fut(fId , d)
w-get { Wr : fId , Lvl : lev ′ | fut(fId, d) }
< o : c | Att : a, Pr : (l, fId?(x); sl), Cnt : f, Lvl : lev , ... >
−→ if (lev ⊑ lev ′) {Wr : fId ,Lvl : lev ′|...} < o : c | ...,Pr : (l, x := error; sl), ... >
else { Wr : fId ,Lvl : lev ′| ... } < o : c | ...,Pr : (l, x := d; sl), ... >
fut-get fut(fId , d) < o : c | Att : a,Pr : (l, fId?(x); sl),Cnt : f,Lvl : lev , ... >
−→ fut(fId , d) < o : c | ..., Pr : (l, x := d; sl), ... >
Fig. 5. Operational semantics involving wrappers, where [E] = eval(e, (a#l)) and
nfId = new(o, n).
completion message, which makes the future resolved. On the right-hand-side,
if the security level of the completion message (lev ) is high, the future becomes
wrapped. If the future value is low, there is no need to protect it by a wrap-
per. The wrapper has the same identity and level as the future. The w-get rule
represents a wrapped future and an object which wants to get the future value.
If the security level of the object (lev ) asking for the value is smaller than the
wrapper (lev ′), then the wrapper sends an error value; otherwise, the object gets
the future value (d). The fut-get rule shows that an object gets the value from
an unwrapped future without security checking.
3.4 Non-interference
We now sketch a proof that our security framework satisfies noninterference. We
say that two states of an object are low equivalent if they agree on the low values
of the variables (in a#l), while values of high variables may differ.
Definition 1. Global non-interference means that for any two executions with
corresponding objects and futures, and for any corresponding objects with the
same non-idle remaining statement lists (sl) and pcs stacks, we have that the
outputs of the two objects are low equivalent (modulo the differences in object
and future identities) as long as they consume the same low equivalent inputs.
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Definition 2. Local non-interference means that in two executions of an object
with consumption of low equivalent inputs, the states are low equivalent.
We first prove that each object is locally deterministic, in the sense that the next
state of a statement (other than idle) is deterministic, i.e., depending only on the
prestate and any input. The only source of non-determinism is the independent
speed of the objects, which means that the ordering in the messages queues is
in general non-deterministic. Only idle states may give rise to non-determinism.
Lemma 1. In our security model, each object is locally deterministic.
Proof. According to our operational semantics, for each statement (other than
idle) there is only one rule to apply, and for an if statement there are two rules,
but the choice is given by testing the security level of the guard. There is no
interleaving of processes inside an object as well. ⊓⊔
Definition 3. Low-to-low determinism means that any low part of a state or
output resulting from a statement is determined by the low part of the prestate.
Lemma 2. In our security model, each object is low-to-low deterministic.
Proof. This can be proved by case analysis on the statements. For an if with
a high test, there is no low state change (resulting in low tags) nor low output
in any branch. For an if with low test, the choice of branch is given by the low
part of the prestate. The cases for the other statements are straightforward. ⊓⊔
Theorem 1. Our security model guarantees local and global non-interference,
and an attacker will only receive low information.
Proof. Local non-interference can be proved by induction of the number of exe-
cution steps considering two executions of an object. The low part of each state
and the low outputs must be the same by the two previous lemmas. Global non-
interference can be proved by induction on the number of steps considering two
executions. It follows by local non-interference for all objects. Since an attacker
is a low object, the wrappers will prevent it to receive high inputs, and the low
inputs will be the same. ⊓⊔
4 Related work
A static and class-wise information-flow analysis has been suggested for Creol
without futures by Owe and Ramezanifarkhani in [17]. The authors proved
soundness and a non-interference property in object interactions based on an
operational semantics. In contrast to the present paper, futures are not consid-
ered. Our approach is a dynamic technique which is more permissive and precise.
To reduce the run-time overhead, we combine it with a sound static analysis, as
the one in [17].
In a paper by Attali et al. [2], a dynamic information-flow control approach
is performed for the ASP language. Security levels are assigned to activities and
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communicated data (an activity includes an active object and several passive
objects controlled by one thread). The security levels do not change when they
are assigned. Dynamic checks are performed at activity creations, requests, and
replies. Since future references are not confidential, they are passed between
activities without dynamic checking, but getting a future value is checked by a
reply transmission rule. In [2], the security model guarantees data confidentiality
for multi-level security (MLS) systems, which means that an entity is allowed
to access only the information that it is allowed to access. Our approach adds
flow-sensitivity, which allows security levels of variables to change inside an ob-
ject. It makes our approach more permissive and a wrapper deals with run-time
security levels. In addition to enforcing the non-interference property in object
interactions, our approach guarantees that an object will be given access only
to the information that it is allowed to handle.
Russo and Sabelfeld [19] prove that a sound flow-sensitive dynamic information-
flow enforcement is more permissive than static analysis. Magazinius et al. [15]
use the notion of wrappers to control the behavior of JavaScript programs and
enforce security policies to protect web pages from malicious codes. The security
policies avoid web browser vulnerabilities and protect web pages. A policy spec-
ifies under what conditions a page may perform a specific action, and a wrapper
grants, rejects, or modifies these actions. Moreover, the notion of wrappers has
been developed for the safety of objects [18], letting an object wrapper control
which actions should be taken for any input/output. We here exploit wrappers
for dealing with information security, by extending the run-time system with
security levels, and applying dynamic checking for securing object interactions.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a framework for enforcing secure information-flow and non-
interference in active object languages based on the notion of security wrappers.
We have considered a high-level core language supporting asynchronous calls and
futures. In our model, due to encapsulation, there is no need for information-flow
restrictions inside an object. Wrappers perform security checks for object inter-
actions (with methods and futures) at run-time. Furthermore, wrappers control
the access to the futures with confidential values. Security rules of wrappers are
defined based on security levels assigned to objects, actual parameters, fields and
local variables. Inside an object, the security levels of variables might change at
run-time due to flow-sensitivity. In the setting where concurrent objects commu-
nicate confidential or non-confidential information, wrappers on unsafe objects
and future components protect exchange of confidential values. Wrappers on ob-
jects protect outgoing method calls and prevent leakage of information through
outgoing parameters. The wrappers are created by the run-time system without
the involved parties being aware of it. The notion of security wrappers enable
dynamic enforcement of avoidance of information flow leakage. We define non-
interference and outline a proof of it. By combining results from static analysis,
we can improve run-time efficiency by avoiding wrappers when they are super-
fluous according to the over-approximation of levels given by the static analysis.
16 Farzane Karami , Olaf Owe, and Gerardo Schneider
References
1. Gul A Agha. Actors: A model of concurrent computation in distributed systems.
Technical report, Massachusetts Inst. of Tech, Cambridge Artificial Intelligence
Lab., 1985.
2. Isabelle Attali, Denis Caromel, Ludovic Henrio, and Felipe Luna Del Aguila. Se-
cured information flow for asynchronous sequential processes. Electronic Notes in
Theoretical Computer Science, 180(1):17–34, 2007.
3. Henry C Baker Jr and Carl Hewitt. The incremental garbage collection of processes.
ACM Sigplan Notices, 12(8):55–59, 1977.
4. Frank De Boer, Vlad Serbanescu, Reiner Ha¨hnle, Ludovic Henrio, Justine Rochas,
Crystal Chang Din, Einar Broch Johnsen, Marjan Sirjani, Ehsan Khamespanah,
Kiko Fernandez-Reyes, and Albert Mingkun Yang. A survey of active object lan-
guages. ACM Computing Surveys, 50(5):76, 2017.
5. Stephan Brandauer, Elias Castegren, Dave Clarke, Kiko Fernandez-Reyes,
Einar Broch Johnsen, Ka I Pun, S Lizeth Tapia Tarifa, Tobias Wrigstad, and
Albert Mingkun Yang. Parallel objects for multicores: A glimpse at the parallel
language Encore. In International School on Formal Methods for the Design of
Computer, Communication and Software Systems, volume 9104 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 1–56. Springer, 2015.
6. Denis Caromel, Christian Delbe´, Alexandre Di Costanzo, and Mario Leyton. Proac-
tive: an integrated platform for programming and running applications on Grids
and P2P systems. Computational Methods in Science and Technology, 12, issue
1:16, 2006.
7. Denis Caromel and Ludovic Henrio. A Theory of Distributed Objects: Asynchrony-
Mobility-Groups-Components. Springer, 2005.
8. F Dura´n, S Eker, P Lincoln, N Mart´ı-Oliet, J Meseguer, and C Talcott. All about
Maude: A high-performance logical framework. LNCS, 4350, 2007.
9. Joseph A Goguen and Jose´ Meseguer. Security policies and security models. In
Security and Privacy, 1982 IEEE Symposium on, pages 11–11. IEEE, 1982.
10. Philipp Haller and Martin Odersky. Scala actors: Unifying thread-based and event-
based programming. Theoretical Computer Science, 410(LAMP-ARTICLE-2008-
003):202–220, 2009.
11. Daniel Hedin and Andrei Sabelfeld. A perspective on information-flow control.
Software Safety and Security, 33:319–347, 2012.
12. Einar Broch Johnsen, Reiner Ha¨hnle, Jan Scha¨fer, Rudolf Schlatte, and Martin
Steffen. ABS: A core language for abstract behavioral specification. In Formal
Methods for Components and Objects, volume 6957 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 142–164. Springer, 2011.
13. Einar Broch Johnsen and Olaf Owe. An asynchronous communication model for
distributed concurrent objects. Software & Systems Modeling, 6(1):39–58, 2007.
14. Farzane Karami, Olaf Owe, and Toktam Ramezanifarkhani. An evaluation of
interaction paradigms for active objects. Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods
in Programming, 103:154 – 183, 2019.
15. Jonas Magazinius, Phu H Phung, and David Sands. Safe wrappers and sane policies
for self protecting Javascript. In Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems, pages
239–255. Springer, 2010.
16. Peter Csaba O¨lveczky. Designing Reliable Distributed Systems: A Formal Methods
Approach Based on Executable Modeling in Maude. Springer, 2018.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 17
17. Olaf Owe and Toktam Ramezanifarkhani. Confidentiality of interactions in con-
current object-oriented systems. In Data Privacy Management, Cryptocurrencies
and Blockchain Technology, volume 10436 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 19–34. Springer, 2017.
18. Olaf Owe and Gerardo Schneider. Wrap your objects safely. Electronic Notes in
Theoretical Computer Science, 253(1):127–143, 2009.
19. Alejandro Russo and Andrei Sabelfeld. Dynamic vs. static flow-sensitive security
analysis. In Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), 2010 23rd IEEE,
pages 186–199. IEEE, 2010.
20. Andrei Sabelfeld and Andrew C Myers. Language-based information-flow security.
IEEE Journal on selected areas in communications, 21(1):5–19, 2003.
21. Marjan Sirjani, Ali Movaghar, and Mohammad Reza Mousavi. Compositional
verification of an object-based model for reactive systems. In Proceedings of the
Workshop on Automated Verification of Critical Systems (AVoCS’01), Oxford, UK,
pages 114–118. Citeseer, 2001.
22. Marjan Sirjani, Ali Movaghar, Amin Shali, and Frank S De Boer. Modeling and ver-
ification of reactive systems using Rebeca. Fundamenta Informaticae, 63(4):385–
410, 2004.
23. Derek Wyatt. Akka concurrency. Artima Incorporation, 2013.
18 Farzane Karami , Olaf Owe, and Gerardo Schneider
5.1 Appendix
Theorem 2 (No leackage from a wrapped future). A high future value
will not be passed to a low object.
Proof. Since each call has a unique future identity, there is at most one write
operation on a future component, and by the rule w-fut in Fig. 5, the future
component is placed in a wrapper if the future value is high. And this wrapper
is not removed by any rule. Any get operation of such a future is handled by
rule w-get in Fig. 5, and this rule will not pass such a high future value to a
low object. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3 (No high message to a low level object). A message with high
level tag is not sent to a low level object.
Proof. According to the w-invc rule in Fig. 5, an invocation message is only
sent out of a wrapper if the level of the destination object is higher than the
level of the message. Otherwise, the invocation message is deleted from inside the
wrapper. This wrapper is not removed by any rule. For a completion message,
if the level of the completion message is high, then the corresponding future
becomes wrapped (rule w-fut in Fig. 5). According to the Theorem 2, there is
no leakage from a wrapped future. ⊓⊔
We define low outputs generated from an object as:
Definition 4. (Low outputs) The low output of a call statement performed by
an object is the generated low invocation message. An invocation message is low
if it does not contain any actual parameter with high security level, and it is not
generated in a high context where pc = H (rule call’ in Fig. 4). The low output
of a new statement is given by the actual class parameters. The observable output
of a return statement is the low completion message. A completion message is
low if the return value is low, and it is not generated in a high context (rule
return in Fig. 4).
Non-interference means that in two executions, if we change the high inputs but
not the low ones, the resulting low outputs for the attacker must be the same.
In our security approach, an attacker does not get any high message because of
the security wrappers (proved by Theorem 3), but it can receive low messages
or low outputs from other objects. In order to prove non-interference, it suffices
to show that the low outputs of the two executions are low equivalent, i.e., they
agree on low variables, and low outputs are not resulted from high information.
By Lemma 1 we prove that each object is locally deterministic, in the sense
that the next state of a statement (other than idle) only depends on the prestate
and any input. We prove by Lemma 2 that objects are low-to-low determinism,
where the low part of the next state of a statement is determined by the low part
of the prestate or any input. One interesting case for Lemma 2 could be that
when inside an object pcs 6= emp (or pc = H), then after each statement, all the
state changes are high, and the object produces no low outputs. It is proved in
Lemma 3.
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In order to show the behavior of an object when pcs 6= emp and non-
interference, we let R denote a run-time configuration, and R/o the projection
of the local run-time configuration of object o. To conserve space, R/o is a com-
pact notation of a flow-sensitive object component (flowsen-obj ) in Fig. 3, and
it contains attributes like the identity (o), the current statement that the object
is about to perform (sl), the current state of the object (σ = a#l), the stack of
pcs , and the rest is indicated by [...]. For example, R/o =< o|sl , σ, ..., pcs > is
o’s configuration, where sl is a list of statements to be performed by the object,
σ is the current state of the object, a map composition of the attribute state
a and local state l (σ = a#l), and pcs is the stack of context security level.
According to the operational semantics in Fig. 4, variables are stored in the sate
of an object with their values and security levels, where σse denotes the secu-
rity level environment, mapping variables to security levels, and σm denotes the
object memory, mapping variables to values. One step of execution is denoted
by: < o|s, σ, ..., pcs >−→α< o|s′, σ′, ..., pcs ′ >, where α is the possible produced
output, σ is the prestate state, and σ′ is the next state. A sequence of execution
steps inside an object is denoted by −→∗α, where α is a (possible empty) list of
produced concatenated outputs (including outgoing invocation and completion
messages, created futures, and objects). The relation α1 < α2 means that α1 is
a strict prefix of α2, and low (α) denotes the projection of low outputs from α.
The next lemma describes the behavior of an active flow-sensitive object when
pcs 6= emp (which corresponds to pc = H). We say that two states, inputs, or
outputs of an object are low equivalent (≈L) if they agree on the low values of
the variables, while variables with high values may differ.
Lemma 3. Given a statement s that contains no endif instruction, pcs 6= emp,
and < o|s, σ, ..., pcs >−→∗α< o|idle , σ
′, ..., pcs ′ > then:
(i) pcs′ = pcs
(ii) σ′ = σ ⊔ updateH (s)
(iii) σ′ ≈L σ (The post and prestate are low equivalent.)
(iv) low (α) = ∅
where σ⊔updateH (s) raises the security levels of variables appearing on the left-
hand-side of assignments in the statement s and updates them in the object’s
state.
Proof. by induction on −→∗, we show it with some case analysis and the oper-
ational semantics in Fig. 4 (where in the rules, as mentioned before, fields that
are not changed on the right-hand-side are denoted by ....):
– x := e;
According to the assign rule, item (i) holds since an assignment does not
change the pcs stack. Item (ii) holds since pc = H , and σ′ = σ[x 7→
[e]level([e])⊔pc] = σ[x 7→ [e]H ] ⇒ σ
′ = σ ⊔ updateH(x := e). Item (iii) holds
since there is no low state change resulting in a low tag, and the values of low
variables in the post state σ′ and the prestate σ are the same. An assignment
produces no output, thus item (iv) holds.
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– return d;
According to the return rule, item (i) holds since it does not change the
pcs . updateH (return d) = ∅, and item (ii) holds. This statement does not
change the object’s state, so the post and pre-state are low equivalent, and
item (iii) holds . Since pc = H , the return statement generates a completion
message with a high security level, and item (iv) holds .
– q!o′.m(e);
According to the call rule, this statement is reduced to q := nfId ; !o′.m(e).
The first statement is an assignment; therefore, all the items hold, and we
have σ′ = σ ⊔ updateH (q := nfId). For the second statement, according
to the call’ rule, item (i) holds since it does not change the pcs . A call
statement does not change the object’s state, so the post and pre-state are
low equivalent, and items (ii, iii) hold, where updateH (!o
′.m(e)) = ∅. Item
(iv) holds, since pc = H , and this statement creates an invocation message
with a high security level.
– if e th s1 [el s2]fi;
Since pcs 6= emp, the if-high rule is applied. According to this rule, H is
pushed to the pcs ; however, at the joint point, the added level is removed
from the pcs (pcs .pop()) by the endif rule. Therefore, at the end of an
if structure, we have pcs ′ = pcs , and item (i) holds. The taken branch
is evaluated in a high context, and the security levels of variables in the
untaken branch are raised by H in the endif rule. Therefore, at the end of
an if structure, item (ii) holds, where σ′ = σ ⊔ updateH (s1, s2). Item (iii)
holds, since the if-high rule only results in high state changes, so σ′ ≈L σ.
Item (iv) holds since pc = H ; therefore, any output generated in either of
the branches has a high security level.
– x := newlevC
′(e);
According to the new rule, this statement is reduced to x := newId ; !x.init(e),
where for the first statement, all the items hold similar to an assignment.
For the second statement, similar to a call (when pc = H) all the items hold.
– fId?(x) (a get statement on the future fId);
According to the fut-get rule in Fig. 5, this statement reduces to x := d,
where d is the future value. Items (i, ii, iii) hold similar to an assignment.
Item (iv) holds since it produces no output. This statement might raise an
exception in case the object’s level is low and the the future value is high as
shown in the w-get in Fig. 5.
⊓⊔
Next we formalize and prove local non-interference, defined in Definition 2. o1
and o2 are the corresponding objects in two executions of an object.
Lemma 4. (Local Non-Interference for Objects).
< o1|sl , σ1, ..., pcs >−→
∗
α1
< o1|sl
′, σ′1, ..., pcs
′ > ∧
< o2|sl , σ2, ..., pcs >−→
∗
α2
< o2|sl
′′, σ′2, ..., pcs
′′ > ∧ σ1 ≈L σ2 ⇒
σ′1 ≈L σ
′
2 ∧ pcs
′′ = pcs ′ ∧ low (α2) = low (α1)
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Proof. It can be proved by induction of the number of execution steps considering
two executions of an object with wrappers and corresponding futures. The low
part of each state and the low outputs must be the same by Lemmas 1, 2. It
is obvious that according to Lemma 3, if pcs 6= emp then there is no low state
change or output in both objects. The proof is shown for some statements when
pcs = emp.
– return d;
< o1|return d, σ1, ..., pcs > −→α1< o1|idle, σ
′
1, ..., pcs
′
>
< o2|return d, σ2, ..., pcs > −→α2< o2|idle, σ
′
2, ..., pcs
′′
>
Since a return statement does not change an object’s state or the pcs ,
we have σ1 = σ
′
1 ≈L σ
′
2 = σ2 and pcs
′′ = pcs ′. If level(d) = L, then d
has the same value in both states because σ1 ≈L σ2, i.e., σm1 (d) = σ
m
2 (d)
(σm(d) returns the value of d stored in σ). Correspondingly, the objects
produce low completion messages, where low (α2) = low (α1). Moreover, the
corresponding futures also become low equivalent. If level (d) = H , then both
objects produce high completion messages, where low (α2) = low (α1) = ∅.
The corresponding futures become high and wrapped correspondingly.
– if e th s1 el s2;
Depending on the level of e, either the if-low rule or the if-high rule in
Fig. 4 is applied. If level(e) = L, then σm1 (e) = σ
m
2 (e), and both objects take
the same branch, thus σ′1 ≈L σ
′
2 holds. The if-low rule does not change the
pcs , and pcs ′′ = pcs ′ holds. If level (e) = H , the if-high rule pushes H to
the pcs , resulting pc = H . Since level (e) = H , we have σm1 (e) 6= σ
m
2 (e), and
objects take different branches but produce no low outputs, where low(α2) =
low (α1) = ∅. It is proved by Lemma 3 that when pc = H , an object does
not produce a low output. Moreover, we have σ′1 ≈L σ
′
2, it follows from
the fact that in the if-high and endif rules, the security levels of variables
appearing on the left-hand-side of assignments in both branches are raised
to high. Thus states of both objects remain low equivalent after updating,
i.e., σ1 ≈L σ2 ⇒ σ1 ⊔ updateH(s1, s2) ≈L σ2 ⊔ updateH(s1, s2)⇒ σ
′
1 ≈L σ
′
2.
According to the endif rule, the pcs stacks of objects return back to the
previous context level, and pcs ′′ = pcs ′ = pcs holds.
– !o′.m(e); s′;
< o1|!o
′
.m(e); s′, σ1, ..., pcs > −→α1< o1|s
′
, σ
′
1, ..., pcs
′
>
< o2|!o
′
.m(e); s′, σ2, ..., pcs > −→α2< o2|s
′
, σ
′
2, ..., pcs
′′
>
According to the call’ rule in Fig. 4, since a call statement does not change
an object’ state and the pcs , we have σ1 = σ
′
1 ≈L σ
′
2 = σ2 and pcs
′′ =
pcs ′ = pcs . If level ([e]) = L, it means that all the actual parameters in [e]
are low level, and we have σm1 (e) = σ
m
2 (e). Therefore, the objects produce
low invocation messages, where low (α2) = low (α1). If level ([e]) = H , then
the objects produce high invocation messages, and according to the w-invc
rule in Fig. 5, wrappers do not send these high messages to a low level object.
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– x := newlevC
′(e);
According to the new rule in Fig. 4, this statement is reduced to x :=
newId ; !x.init(e). The first and the second statements do not change the
pcs , thus pcs ′′ = pcs ′ = pcs holds. The first assignment assigns a new object
identity to x, thus the states of objects remain low equivalent σ′1 ≈L σ
′
2.
In the second statement, a call does not change the states of the objects,
thus σ′1 ≈L σ
′
2 holds. If level (e) = L, then the objects produce the same low
invocation messages and α1 = α2. Otherwise, the invocation messages are
high, and if the new objects’ levels are low, then the wrappers do not send
these messages to the new objects.
⊓⊔
Theorem 4. Our security model guarantees local non-interference.
Proof. By induction of the number of execution steps and lemma 4. ⊓⊔
Next we formalize and prove global non-interference, defined in the definition 1.
At the global view, due to non-determinism, two corresponding objects might
receive input messages in different orders. Thus, it is assumed that the execu-
tions start when both objects start with the same low equivalent input messages
and the queries on futures are also low equivalent. In order to describe non-
determinism, we need to consider the set of all possible executions, where two
corresponding objects will take possible messages out of their queues, for which
we use an existential quantifier. The notation R/o1 ≈ R/o2 indicates two cor-
responding objects in the two executions. The notation R/o ;L indicates that
this configuration does not produce any low output.
Lemma 5. (Global Non-Interference for Objects).
< o1|s, σ1, ..., pcs >≈< o2|s, σ2, ..., pcs > ∧ σ1 ≈ σ2
∧ < o1|s, σ1, ..., pcs >−→
∗
α1
< o1|s
′, σ′1, ..., pcs
′ > ⇒ ∃ s′′, σ′2, pcs
′′, α2 .
< o2|s, σ2, ..., pcs >−→
∗
α2
< o2|s
′′, σ′2, ..., pcs
′′ > ∧ σ′1 ≈L σ
′
2 ∧ pcs
′′ = pcs ′
∧ low(α2) ≤ low (α1) ∧ if low(α2) < low (α1) then < o2|s
′′, σ′2, ... >;L
Proof. By induction on
H
−→* on both executions of the two objects with wrappers
and corresponding futures, and Lemmas 4 and 3. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. (Non-interference) Our security model using the wrapper mecha-
nism guarantees global non-interference, and an attacker will only receive low
information.
Proof. By Lemma 5 and Theorems 2 and 3. ⊓⊔
